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Mr. Robert Breen (Barrister): I practise in the labour field. I am not certain that 
I have the new-found religion that you referred to. Your rejectionist 
theories fails to give consideration to a specific provision that is found in 
all of the labour acts and is that the board is mandated to “determine all 
questions of law and fact that arise before it.” It would seem to me that 
your rejectionist thesis is based on the thought that while the board shall 
consider all questions of law, it shall not consider what s. 52 of the 
Charter speaks as to the supreme law of Canada. I don’t know how you 
can rationalize that. It would seem to me that surely the Board must - in 
fact it is mandated to consider the supreme law of Canada. Where is the 
loss in the board considering the issue in the first instance, particularly if 
you also give rise to the flexibility of the Board with respect to procedure 
and admissibility of evidence. It is that one provision that is in all labour 
acts that shall determine all questions of law that I have some trouble 
with.
Professor Kuttner: My answer to that is that you are a follower of Kelsen and his 
positivism in which he says that every law applying organ has the power 
of refusing to hear constitutional issues but also says that this power is 
premised subject to whether or not there is an explicit rule to the con­
trary. My whole thesis is that there is. The Constitution itself is the ex­
plicit rule to the contrary, namely, the judiciary. That is a judicial func­
tion and I point out in the paper that s. 52 doesn’t say the Charter is the 
supreme law - it says the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law. 
The Constitution embraces what I have been talking about, this division 
and balance of power. Labour boards have always been able to 
determine questions of law but never, in fact, have they expressly refused 
to permit attacks on their legislation under the federal principle. The 
O ntario Board was asked years ago to make a finding of un­
constitutionality of a provision of the Ontario Labour Relations Act based 
on the federal principle in the transportation section and the Board said 
we do not have that jurisdiction. What we can do is make determina­
tions of what I call constitutional fact. We can look at the facts in front 
of us and determine whether they fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Labour Relations Board. But even there, they are now getting 
too dose to what I call the critocracy - the judges don’t like this and they 
have always said that whatever decision you make, the OLRB is owed no 
deference whatsoever because only we, the courts, can ultimately make 
these determinations. Never has the Ontario Labour Relations said that 
we will actually determine what the legislature said is lawful. That hap­
pened right here in New Brunswick because one of the arguments made 
in the fishing industry board was that only Parliament could control col-
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lective relations in the fishery. I’m not going to start striking down the 
fisheries act of New Brunswick on the basis of federalism. That is not 
my function. You can argue about whether these particular fisherman, 
for a variety of reasons, actually are federal - that’s fine and I might be 
able to make that finding, but I can’t say that the statute can be struck 
down. That is the approach all American administrative tribunals take. 
To determine law, I say it is something different from determining con­
stitutionality.
Mr. Breen: But isn’t it possible to draw the distinction between the authority of 
the board to consider s. 52 and yet not be a court of competent jurisdic­
tion? J
Professor Kuttner: Section 52 says nothing different than what always been 
true. The Constitution has always been the supreme law of the land and 
any law inconsistent has been always of no force and effect and that is 
what one hundred years of jurisprudence coming under federalism is all 
about. It was unconstitutional for the Ontario Labour Relations Board 
to have taken jurisdiction in the telecommunications field - which it did - 
but it didn’t make that determination. That was made 15 years later by 
the Supreme Court of Canada when someone challenged it. And, when 
they challenged it in front of the Board the Board said, “We have been 
doing this for years - go somewhere else.”
Professor Kaplan: I have a very practical question to ask you. The Charter was 
sold to the Canadian people as a peoples’ packet, notwithstanding that 
Professor Sheppard and others have described it as an 18th Century doc­
ument and this is the 20th Century and we should be looking forward 
and not backwards. We have these Charter rights and according to the 
formulation which you have just given us, and the theory which you have 
just presented to us, these administrative tribunals should not be apply­
ing the Charter and giving Charter remedies. Well my question is, what 
about the results of that formulation? Namely, people who are in a dis­
pute with the state over social assistance and welfare rights and the or­
dinary course of their dispute with the statement they carry before an ad­
ministrative tribunal, they won’t be allowed to claim their Charter rights. 
What you are saying, in effect is only the people who can afford to go to 
court to seek remedy can have one. For everyone else they won’t get 
their Charter remedies before the tribunals which have been established 
by Parliament to provide benefits and other things for them. I am dis­
turbed by the consequences of that - namely that it reserves the Charter 
to only a small segment of governmental action in Canadian society 
when, in fact, most people in Canadian society are regulated by administ­
rative tribunals and not by the courts - with the exception of course 
criminal contact. ’
Professor Kuttner: That argument is a standard argument that’s made and I 
think it is a false argument because every case that I have ever seen
where a board has given a Charter remedy, it has gone to court anyway. I 
think the reality is that once you start to touch the centrality of om Con­
stitution - actually claiming that Parliament has overreached - its in­
evitable that you are going to go to court over that because people are 
not satisfied with what a mere tribunal says about that. The person who 
is particularly dissatisfied will be the Attorney General. The other theory 
I have which I didn’t put down here is that I think there is a constitu­
tional duty to uphold the legislation if it is challenged for a point in fact. 
They can actually ignore the Charter challenge and just do what we have 
always been doing - which is furthering the legislative policy as we see fit. 
In doing that, my theory is that we are doing the very thing that the 
courts will ultimately look for, which is, what is the s. 1 justification? The 
beauty of having tribunals is, unlike Parliament, it cannot explain what it 
means. But the boards actually do. They interpret the parliamentary act 
and so the courts will naturally look to see well what does it mean. Why 
does Parliament do this by just looking at the board jurisprudence. This 
is a function they do totally removed from s. 1 - this is what they have 
been doing since they were created, furthering a particular governmental 
policy. I don’t really think that any sort of close analysis would withstand 
scrutiny in terms of access. I don’t really believe that. Now that is my 
reaction, I think one would have to look at that.
Professor John McEvoy (Law, University of New Brunswick): In s. 96 terms, we 
have the provincial court system and the ability of the province to confer 
judicial power upon provincial courts and statutory-based courts,  ^can t 
that power also be conferred upon the administrative tribunal? Isn t that 
the real problem that exists, the model of the provincial court?
Professor Kuttner: Maybe I can read you what I have to say about that - because 
that was the fly in the ointment for me. I said: “How is the newly articu­
lated jurisprudence touching a court of competent jurisdiction?” That is 
the Mills case, to be integrated into the theory I have just propelled it. It 
clearly recognizes an inferior court’s exercising a criminal law making 
power the right to restraint democratic parliaments by application of 
constitutional norms. Then the next sentence is my understatement. 
The devolution of superior court jurisdiction in criminal law matters to 
inferior provincial courts is a subject of some complexity, as you well 
know Professor McEvoy. Great as it has been, we know that it cannot be 
absolute - that it is so folsome as to include the deeply constitutional role 
to restrain democratic power I say can only be explained by the degree of 
independence that provincial court judges enjoy. This is in the Valente 
case in which we see that provincial court judges, although not as inde­
pendent as high court, do exercise a certain degree of all these elements 
of independence which no administrative tribunal has. They can’t be dis­
missed at will. When the liberty of the subject is at stake, the decision 
maker must have the fullness of constitutional powers to deal with that 
issue. I say again, administrative tribunals just are not dealing with that 
subject. Finally, in a footnote, I say for this reason I think that the B.C.
Court of Appeal was mistaken that a provincial court judge, not in a 
criminal law setting, but in just a normal welfare case setting, struck 
down provisions of the B.C. welfare-type statute, I think is wrong be­
cause it was outside of this area. Now that is just my own theorizing. 
Maybe they will always have this right in any area. But, I thinlr that one 
can distinguish criminal law cases from any other type of decision­
making on the basis of the liberty of the subject.
Professor D. Townsend: I have two practical questions. First, when Justice 
McLaughlin gave her talk last night she described the challenge ahead in 
the Charter period for all judges, a tremendous challenge when you con­
sider the amount of staffing resources available to the justices generally, 
the resource of their legal education, the quality of argument by counsel,’ 
it really is one heck of a challenge. Aren’t you really denying the court 
the ability to stand on the shoulders of what this labour board has de­
cided when we are going to take it off the court at first instance, when it 
might be a tremendous assistance to the court if there had been a deci­
sion already?
Professor Kuttner: Well, the way I look at that David is, I agree with you. Initial­
ly I had this idea that when there is a challenge, you immediately find it 
constitutional and give s. 1 reason. Then I realized that I don’t really 
need that. The way I see it, the labour board is constantly articulating 
the rationale for whatever Parliament has done. The way that the courts 
can get to that is by exercising the same deference that it always has now 
in just normal judicial reviews. For instance, the Ontario divisional court 
has said it will refuse to hear an application for prohibition whatsoever 
coming from the board. There is always one little exception, because 
they want to hear the board’s views and determination first. All chal­
lenges should come after the board has dealt with the substantive matter.
I think that in constitutional matters perhaps the same approach could 
be taken, that the court would say: “We aren’t interested in hearing the 
constitutional argument until we have seen the labour board come down 
with this labour law decision on whatever and then we will let someone 
challenge that decision and we will have” - that’s my theory - whatever 
the board has decided is it s. 1 values. Now, this puts boards in a hard 
position, for instance, the Ontario Labour Relations Board would love to 
strike down the agricultural exclusion because it doesn’t fit with labour 
relations and collective bargaining theory. But, I don’t think it has the 
right. What it can say is all sorts of things about that exclusion and 
ultimately try and give what the rationale was because there is a rationale
- and it might be a very weak rationale. When the court looks at it, the 
court will say well, forget that - that was the rationale for the agricultural 
workers exclusion - we are not interested in that - we are going to strike 
it down. On the other hand, the closed shop, the Rand formula - there 
are very strong  ^rationales for those and labour boards have articulated 
them and explained them in many, many cases.”
Professor D. Townsend: The second part may be far more of a comment. But 
labour relations is a minuscule aspect of the statutory decision-making 
that goes on and my observation of statutory decision-makers indicates 
that they make accommodations all the time at an informal level. It may 
well be that they will not be making formal declarations of law, they may 
be making accommodations on a regular basis based on the arguments 
of counsel.
Professor Kuttner: I am not sure what the answer is to that.
Professor Myron Gochnauer (Law, University of New Brunswick): Tom, I would 
Klee, to be very impractical, to go back to the ancient term m it, m sort ot 
the general scheme of what you are talking about, kind of the deep logic 
of it, where do you see administrative tribunals fitting? Are they in the 
sort of democratic side linked with persuasion and rhetoric or are they 
are on the critocratic side of whatever it is concerned with dialectic, 
Platonic truths. Where do these boards fit? Clearly the court, in your vi­
sion, is on the side of Plato and kind of abstract truths and the legisla­
tures are on the side of rhetoric and speech and persuasion. Where do 
your boards fit?
Professor Kuttner: I think the boards are on the side of the legislatures, because 
the legislature doesn’t have time to explain why it created collective 
bargaining and so it says here, you do it, this is the formula. Explain why 
it is and make sure that it works. So, the boards have a mission. I don t 
think the judges have a mission. Judges are to apply law - 1 know this is 
very schematic but they do not have a mission to further the Parliament s 
will in the same way as boards do. They have a mission to ensure that 
the law really does reflect what Parliament wanted. You test Parliament 
against all sorts of things. Labour boards look at it as - 1 say the basic 
principle is to join free trade unions. In my view, this is what Parliament 
wants and by God I am going to see that it happens. I don’t care that 
anybody that tries to put up barriers against it, we will strike them down. 
If it is a barrier of free speech, we will strike it down. There is no such 
things in reality, as employer free speech under the labour law jurispru­
dence. The minute an employer opens up his mouth, he is engaging m 
unfair labour practices by our theory, whereas by a judge’s theory, he is 
expressing commercial free speech. I don’t think I can agree that with a 
union shop there is commercial free speech, if a sign in English is com­
mercial free speech, but it is intimidation of workers by jurisprudent 
labour boards and thankfully courts have said: “We are not too expert on 
employer free speech under labour legislation, so we’ll let the boards, 
even if we don’t agree with it, its rationale and, therefore, we let it 
stand.” I prefer to stay on that type of relationship with courts.
Madame Justice McLachlin: I hesitate to toss a question at this learned gentle­
men. I  wonder if the issue has to be black or white. Doesn t s. 24 talk 
about, in P.«gl«h, court of competent jurisdiction and the other version
tribunal. Why must it be either court or tribunal that has the jurisdiction. 
Why can t it be a tribunal designed to deal with an issue that has a prob­
lem.
Professor Kuttner: Well, as I said, I still think there is this constitutional fact idea
v - s i^aPe w^at issue is before them. But the reason I 
think it is either/or is really what my paper is about. This has been a 
true revolution m our constitution which is much further than the Amer­
icans ever went to with their entrenched bill because no American 
tribunal touches Bill of Rights questions. The LNRB said in 1946, they 
didn t even discuss it - they put in a footnote, as being so obvious that 
u ! ^  1 attack the Wagner Act, its not worth even arguing about. Is 
the Charter a complete usurpation of our constitution or do we still have 
a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom? I say 
that if we allow this, we have diverted from a constitution similar in prin­
ciple with the United Kingdom because we have now conferred one of 
the central features of the judicial power on anyone. Actually, Madame 
Justice McKinley said that actually anybody who has to deal with any 
legislation can ignore it, any actor. Of course she might be wrong but mv 
theory on that is that she has just elevated civil disobedience into a kind 
of principle of constitutional acting. But the whole theory of civil dis­
obedience is that you come to that as kind of a final ultimate last resort. 
It »  not the sort of thing a guy handing out motor vehicle licenses de­
cides. If he says: “I don’t like it - I don’t think there should be a 
Nouveau-Brunswick on the license plates - therefore I refuse to issue 
them on that” and starts to stamp them out. Civil liberties go to the 
citizen - not to a branch of government or an arm of the government in 
the exercise of its own jurisdiction. One should resign ultimately, but I 
don t thmk that you can elevate a theory of civil disobedience to a princi­
ple of administration of the welfare state - it just wouldn’t work. Every­
body would be disagreeing with everything. We know civil servants don’t 
like bilingualism, but if we allow them then to exercise their civil 
liberties, there might be chaos.
Madame Justice McLachlin: Just to follow up on the questions referring to 
whether or not the boards are exercising the judicial function. You sug­
gested it might be legislative - the comments you make just now suggest 
to me it jnight be executive. Many of these boards are carrying out the 
design of the legislature in an executive sort of way. Would you accept
Professor Kuttner: I would agree with that. That’s just the problem of our con­
stitution. I think that the executive exercises power only when Parlia­
ment has said they cannot. So they come out of both the legislature and 
the executive. Actually Justice Marseau addresses this issue. He doesn’t 
put it this way but essentially he says: “These English judges reading 
what tribunal means m French - they are not equipped to even under­
stand it. Tribunal and the use of tribunal,” he says, “has nothing to
with administrative tribunals.” I am just giving you his interpretation. 
He has written reams on this in his decisions. Farrier is his most recent 
decision in which he totally rejects the use of the French side to do what 
he considers to be a totally usurpation of the constitution.
Mr. Rubin: If I may go back, Professor Kuttner, to what Dr. Kaplan raised ear­
lier. I agree with the logic of what you are saying and the grounds for 
holding that administrative boards are not competent jurisdiction and 
particularly with respect to those boards that are made up of individual 
people, none of whom have any legal training. However, there are pure­
ly administrative boards and then there are quasi-judicial boards. I think 
that it must be left open to individuals appearing, especially before the 
quasi-judidal boards to raise certain Charter arguments. The weight and 
value of those arguments for purposes of precedent are of no value, but 
they are important in value to the party appearing before the Board at 
particular time. Your response to Dr. Kaplan’s remarks were exact­
ly that you are not aware of any Charter argument raised before an ad­
ministrative board that hadn’t gone on to the court. One of the board s 
Dr. Kaplan referred to was a board that might be landlord & tenant or 
whatever. I think you will find that very few Charter arguments raised 
before boards of that nature will end up in the courts. The parties are 
not of the same nature finandally or otherwise or sophistication as the 
parties who normally appear before a labour relations board. Therefore, 
if the parties appearing before an administrative board are not allowed 
to raise a Charter argument for purposes of their case only, then I think 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the board itself is infringed upon.
Professor Kuttner: This comes back to my view that I think they can discuss the 
Charter in what I call the climate idea. They can say to those residential 
tenancies board when you are looking at this issue of the securities 
deposit. I think that board can say: “Fine, we’ll hear you out” and it can 
help in terms of getting this climate idea. The person is trying to give 
them the Charter climate that they should be looking at their own legisla­
tion in; I think that is fine. It is different when you interpret what the 
legislation is or what you can do with it. Remember what Justice Beetz 
said about Charter relief, that we are not in a totalitarian sodety contrary 
to the views of Chairman LaPointe. LaPointe gave what I tell my stu­
dents is the Mao Tse Tung relief, he made the President of the Bank of 
Commerce write a letter apologizing saying how sorry he was for having 
breached the Act. Beetz said this was totalitarian. I don’t think you can 
say to the board please ignore s. 2(b)(c) of the statute - its of no force 
and effect. My view on that is if you say that, I have no competence 
whatsoever to do what you say. I do have competence to determine what 
this means within the setting of our entire law just as I do in terms of 
common law. I look at rules of evidence when I make an evidentiary
finding.
[Unidentified]: Is there a danger important questions may not get to the courts if 
we don’t allow them to be raised before a tribunal?
Professor Kuttner: I don’t think so. I think important questions bubble to the 
top.
[Unidentified]: Well, we see what comes but perhaps there are constitutional 
questions under landlord tenant acts which may never get to the courts if 
they are not raised below. This is something that concerns me. The 
other mechanism, I suppose, is a reference but who is going to bring the 
reference to the Supreme Court or maybe there are other mechanisms 
that you can think of that may answer my questions.
Professor Kuttner: I havn’t thought about that but to tell you the truth, even if 
there is that danger, I don’t think the desirability of determining the con­
stitutionality of a particular act of the legislature is important enough to 
overthrow the entire constitutional structure that we have created for the 
determination of those questions. I think that is what I would say and 
those two - the lesser evil would mean that that one question isn’t 
determined not that we usurp the structure of the state. There is a state­
ment by Justice McIntyre who says something in Dolphin Delivery: “Let 
us remember the Charter didn’t completely revolutionize our entire legal 
and constitutional system.” It still is the same system and I think that 
this is part of it and to do what the Ontario board is doing and the 
Ontario court says it can do, I think is revolutionizing our entire constitu­
tional structure and I don’t think the people of Canada that’s what they 
wanted. They just wanted an entrenched Bill of Rights.
